Any attempt to
coerce the President to yield his sanction to measures which he can not
approve would be a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, palpable
and flagrant, and if successful would break down the independence of the
executive department and make the President, elected by the people and
clothed by the Constitution with power to defend their rights, the mere
instrument of a majority of Congress. A surrender on his part of the
powers with which the Constitution has invested his office would effect
a practical alteration of that instrument without resorting to the
prescribed process of amendment.
With the motives or considerations which may induce Congress to pass any
bill the President can have nothing to do. He must presume them to be as
pure as his own, and look only to the practical effect of their measures
when compared with the Constitution or the public good.
But it has been urged by those who object to the exercise of this
undoubted constitutional power that it assails the representative
principle and the capacity of the people to govern themselves; that
there is greater safety in a numerous representative body than in the
single Executive created by the Constitution, and that the Executive
veto is a "one-man power," despotic in its character.
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