The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our arms
on his coasts and in the populous parts of the interior, would direct
his attention to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for attack,
would concentrate his forces upon it. This would be a condition of
affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guerrilla
warfare, would probably prefer to any other. Were we to assume a
defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages of such a state of
war would be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no contributions
upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of the war, but
must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant
uncertainty at what point on the line or at what time he might make an
assault. He may assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the
interior on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make
a sudden assault upon some one of our posts so distant from any other as
to prevent the possibility of timely succor or reenforcements, and in
this way our gallant Army would be exposed to the danger of being cut
off in detail; or if by their unequaled bravery and prowess everywhere
exhibited during this war they should repulse the enemy, their numbers
stationed at any one post may be too small to pursue him.
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