Moreover, that the eclipse is not the cause of the
interposition, but the interposition of the eclipse, is obvious
because the interposition is an element in the definition of
eclipse, which shows that the eclipse is known through the
interposition and not vice versa.
On the other hand, can a single effect have more than one cause? One
might argue as follows: if the same attribute is predicable of more
than one thing as its primary subject, let B be a primary subject in
which A inheres, and C another primary subject of A, and D and E
primary subjects of B and C respectively. A will then inhere in D
and E, and B will be the cause of A's inherence in D, C of A's
inherence in E. The presence of the cause thus necessitates that of
the effect, but the presence of the effect necessitates the presence
not of all that may cause it but only of a cause which yet need not be
the whole cause. We may, however, suggest that if the connexion to
be proved is always universal and commensurate, not only will the
cause be a whole but also the effect will be universal and
commensurate. For instance, deciduous character will belong
exclusively to a subject which is a whole, and, if this whole has
species, universally and commensurately to those species-i.
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