Let A be war, B
unprovoked raiding, C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is
true of C, the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war on
the unjust aggressor. So A, having war waged upon them, is true of
B, the initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who were
the aggressors. Hence here too the cause-in this case the efficient
cause-is the middle term. (d) This is no less true where the cause
is the final cause. E.g. why does one take a walk after supper? For
the sake of one's health. Why does a house exist? For the preservation
of one's goods. The end in view is in the one case health, in the
other preservation. To ask the reason why one must walk after supper
is precisely to ask to what end one must do it. Let C be walking after
supper, B the non-regurgitation of food, A health. Then let walking
after supper possess the property of preventing food from rising to
the orifice of the stomach, and let this condition be healthy; since
it seems that B, the non-regurgitation of food, is attributable to
C, taking a walk, and that A, health, is attributable to B. What,
then, is the cause through which A, the final cause, inheres in C?
It is B, the non-regurgitation of food; but B is a kind of
definition of A, for A will be explained by it.
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