Thus the same statement takes a different
form: in one form it is continuous demonstration, in the other
definition. Again, thunder can be defined as noise in the clouds,
which is the conclusion of the demonstration embodying essential
nature. On the other hand the definition of immediates is an
indemonstrable positing of essential nature.
We conclude then that definition is (a) an indemonstrable
statement of essential nature, or (b) a syllogism of essential
nature differing from demonstration in grammatical form, or (c) the
conclusion of a demonstration giving essential nature.
Our discussion has therefore made plain (1) in what sense and of
what things the essential nature is demonstrable, and in what sense
and of what things it is not; (2) what are the various meanings of the
term definition, and in what sense and of what things it proves the
essential nature, and in what sense and of what things it does not;
(3) what is the relation of definition to demonstration, and how far
the same thing is both definable and demonstrable and how far it is
not.
11
We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and
there are four causes: (1) the definable form, (2) an antecedent which
necessitates a consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final
cause.
Pages:
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133