So the method just examined of proving it through
another essential nature would be one way of proving essential nature,
because a conclusion containing essential nature must be inferred
through a middle which is an essential nature just as a 'peculiar'
property must be inferred through a middle which is a 'peculiar'
property; so that of the two definable natures of a single thing
this method will prove one and not the other.
Now it was said before that this method could not amount to
demonstration of essential nature-it is actually a dialectical proof
of it-so let us begin again and explain by what method it can be
demonstrated. When we are aware of a fact we seek its reason, and
though sometimes the fact and the reason dawn on us simultaneously,
yet we cannot apprehend the reason a moment sooner than the fact;
and clearly in just the same way we cannot apprehend a thing's
definable form without apprehending that it exists, since while we are
ignorant whether it exists we cannot know its essential nature.
Moreover we are aware whether a thing exists or not sometimes
through apprehending an element in its character, and sometimes
accidentally, as, for example, when we are aware of thunder as a noise
in the clouds, of eclipse as a privation of light, or of man as some
species of animal, or of the soul as a self-moving thing.
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