It follows obviously that definition
and demonstration are neither identical nor contained either within
the other: if they were, their objects would be related either as
identical or as whole and part.
4
So much, then, for the first stage of our problem. The next step
is to raise the question whether syllogism-i.e. demonstration-of the
definable nature is possible or, as our recent argument assumed,
impossible.
We might argue it impossible on the following grounds:-(a) syllogism
proves an attribute of a subject through the middle term; on the other
hand (b) its definable nature is both 'peculiar' to a subject and
predicated of it as belonging to its essence. But in that case (1) the
subject, its definition, and the middle term connecting them must be
reciprocally predicable of one another; for if A is to C, obviously
A is 'peculiar' to B and B to C-in fact all three terms are 'peculiar'
to one another: and further (2) if A inheres in the essence of all B
and B is predicated universally of all C as belonging to C's
essence, A also must be predicated of C as belonging to its essence.
If one does not take this relation as thus duplicated-if, that is, A
is predicated as being of the essence of B, but B is not of the
essence of the subjects of which it is predicated-A will not
necessarily be predicated of C as belonging to its essence.
Pages:
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118