Nor again can
the contention that all conclusions have the same basic truths mean
that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be
drawn. That would be exceedingly naive, for it is not the case in
the clearly evident mathematical sciences, nor is it possible in
analysis, since it is the immediate premisses which are the basic
truths, and a fresh conclusion is only formed by the addition of a new
immediate premiss: but if it be admitted that it is these primary
immediate premisses which are basic truths, each subject-genus will
provide one basic truth. If, however, it is not argued that from the
mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved, nor yet
admitted that basic truths differ so as to be generically different
for each science, it remains to consider the possibility that, while
the basic truths of all knowledge are within one genus, special
premisses are required to prove special conclusions. But that this
cannot be the case has been shown by our proof that the basic truths
of things generically different themselves differ generically. For
fundamental truths are of two kinds, those which are premisses of
demonstration and the subject-genus; and though the former are common,
the latter-number, for instance, and magnitude-are peculiar.
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