I do not, of course, deny that by watching
the frequent recurrence of this event we might, after tracking the
commensurate universal, possess a demonstration, for the
commensurate universal is elicited from the several groups of
singulars.
The commensurate universal is precious because it makes clear the
cause; so that in the case of facts like these which have a cause
other than themselves universal knowledge is more precious than
sense-perceptions and than intuition. (As regards primary truths there
is of course a different account to be given.) Hence it is clear
that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired by
perception, unless the term perception is applied to the possession of
scientific knowledge through demonstration. Nevertheless certain
points do arise with regard to connexions to be proved which are
referred for their explanation to a failure in sense-perception: there
are cases when an act of vision would terminate our inquiry, not
because in seeing we should be knowing, but because we should have
elicited the universal from seeing; if, for example, we saw the
pores in the glass and the light passing through, the reason of the
kindling would be clear to us because we should at the same time see
it in each instance and intuit that it must be so in all instances.
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