Of accidents that are not essential according to our definition of
essential there is no demonstrative knowledge; for since an
accident, in the sense in which I here speak of it, may also not
inhere, it is impossible to prove its inherence as a necessary
conclusion. A difficulty, however, might be raised as to why in
dialectic, if the conclusion is not a necessary connexion, such and
such determinate premisses should be proposed in order to deal with
such and such determinate problems. Would not the result be the same
if one asked any questions whatever and then merely stated one's
conclusion? The solution is that determinate questions have to be put,
not because the replies to them affirm facts which necessitate facts
affirmed by the conclusion, but because these answers are propositions
which if the answerer affirm, he must affirm the conclusion and affirm
it with truth if they are true.
Since it is just those attributes within every genus which are
essential and possessed by their respective subjects as such that
are necessary it is clear that both the conclusions and the
premisses of demonstrations which produce scientific knowledge are
essential.
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