For indeed the
conviction of pure science must be unshakable.
3
Some hold that, owing to the necessity of knowing the primary
premisses, there is no scientific knowledge. Others think there is,
but that all truths are demonstrable. Neither doctrine is either
true or a necessary deduction from the premisses. The first school,
assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by
demonstration, maintain that an infinite regress is involved, on the
ground that if behind the prior stands no primary, we could not know
the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right, for one
cannot traverse an infinite series): if on the other hand-they say-the
series terminates and there are primary premisses, yet these are
unknowable because incapable of demonstration, which according to them
is the only form of knowledge. And since thus one cannot know the
primary premisses, knowledge of the conclusions which follow from them
is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all, but
rests on the mere supposition that the premisses are true. The other
party agree with them as regards knowing, holding that it is only
possible by demonstration, but they see no difficulty in holding
that all truths are demonstrated, on the ground that demonstration may
be circular and reciprocal.
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