Thus, the States issued letters of marque and reprisal; Congress
determined on peace and war, but the States were depended on to accept
the former and carry on the latter when declared. Congress might
ascertain the number of ships and men to be furnished, but the States
appointed the officers. Congress might fix the sums necessary to be used
in defraying public expenses, but the States must raise them. Congress
might regulate the value of coin, but the States might issue it. The
loose character of this tie is seen still more plainly in the fact that
there was no efficient final tribunal. The commissioners appointed by
Congress might decide a controversy arising between two States, but
there was nothing by which the commissioners could be guided, no
stability or force as precedents in their decisions when made, and no
power to enforce them if neglected or rejected by one or both the
parties. It was simply a provision for constantly recurring arbitration,
obtained by reference to a changeable, and practically unauthoritative
board of judges. Moreover, this government, weak and unorganized as it
was, was withdrawn on the adjournment of Congress; for the Committee of
States, appointed to act in the recess, was useless, as well from the
paucity of its powers, as from the fact that a quorum of its members
could seldom be obtained.
Such a system, or rather, lack of system, could be tolerated only while
the peril of their life and liberties compelled the people to perform
the duties the government was powerless to enforce.
Pages:
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154